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This article examines the defences in English and Canadian criminal law
available to battered women who kill their abusers. The article sets out in
detail the formation and evolution of the doctrinal interpretation, in English
law, of the defences of provocation, diminished responsibility, and
self-defence. Current case law is examined, including the recent cases of
Thornton andAhluwalia. The objective of the essay is to provide a critical
context, namely the legal construction of the phenomenon of conjugal
violence, in which we can see the current elaboration of these defences. The
Canadian position is investigated, by means of a thorough reading of Laval/e,
in order to provide a comparative critique of the inadequacies of the English
criminal defences. In conclusion, the article proposes several possible sources
of reform, through which the defences in English law might be brought closer
to the Canadian position.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article investigates the current law relating to the defences
available to battered women who kill their abusers, in England and in
Canada. Its aim is to argue the urgent need for reform of the law in
England and to examine the various possibilities for bringing about
reform, based on an elaboration of current doctrinal and judicial
interpretation. As a result of a recent decision in their Supreme Court,
the current law in Canada will be set out as illustrative of a direction that
could be taken by reformers in England. While, as a feminist critic, I
remain sceptical about the wholesale benefits of legal reform as a
response to an issue such as the widespread battering of women in
Conjugal Homicide
intimate relationships, 1 there remain several reasons why it is worthwhile
to argue the need for legal reform.
First, arguments for reform are being put forward by various
groups and individuals.2 Few have examined developments in Canadian
law as a source for reformist inspiration; yet the changes achieved in that
jurisdiction seem to offer some of the most hopeful possibilities for the
defence of battered women. Second, criminal law continues to be taught
to English law students in a traditional doctrinal manner with little
reference to comparative material. The result is a blinkered approach to
law and a tendency to overlook the specificity of the situation of the
battered woman by incorporating her into the notion of the "reasonable
man." It seems important to generate research that will enable law
teachers to demonstrate to students that the English approach is neither
the only nor necessarily the best approach. Finally, current legal
interpretation of defences in criminal law has a very real effect on the
women who attempt to excuse or justify their actions in killing their
abusers. At the time of writing, Sara Thornton3 is serving a life sentence
for murder. Kiranjit Ahluwalia, 4 who had been found guilty of murder
in July 1992, had that verdict set aside. A new trial took place in
September 1992, in which she pleaded guilty to manslaughter. However
satisfying it is to see the murder conviction set aside and Ahluwalia able
to leave prison, the new trial was based firmly on the proposition that
new evidence is available to support a defence of diminished
responsibility, rather than on a recognition that judicial interpretation of
her case was narrow and afflicted with masculine stereotyping. Legal
reform of a far-reaching kind, for all the limitations of the reformist
stance, has an urgency and necessity.
The article will demonstrate the general legal position of the
battered woman, including the non-lethal options that are available.
1 Similar scepticism is evinced by Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London:
Routledge, 1989), and E. Comack, "Legal Recognition of the Battered Wife Syndrome': A Victory
for Women?" (Address to the American Society of Criminology Meetings, November 1991)
[unpublished] [hereinafter "Legal Recognition"].
2 For example, the campaigns of Justice for Women, Rights of Women, and Southall Black
Sisters. See also the Private Members' Bill introduced by Jack Ashley, MP, which called for a
redefinition of the law of provocation. Harry Cohen, MP, introduced another bill to demand the
reform of provocation laws, advised by J. Horder, author of a study of provocation entitled
Provocation in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). There have been many
calls for reform since the decision in the re-trial of Kiranjit Ahluwalia in September 1992
(unreported). No Bill has succeeded, and no reform has been enacted.
3 Rv. Thornton, [1992] 1 All E.R. 306 [hereinafter Thornton].
4 P. v.Ahluwalia, [1992] 4 All E.L 889.
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The next section discusses current understanding of the defences that
may be pleaded by the battered woman who kills. In contrast, the
position of the battered woman in Canada is examined. The recent
evolutions in Canadian criminal law, relating to the interpretation of the
law of self-defence are appraised for their relevance to the position in
English law. Lastly, a number of proposals are made for the reform of
the defences available in English law.
II. BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW IN ENGLAND
Before undertaking a discussion of the defences available to the
battered woman who kills her abuser, it is necessary to set out some of
the criminal legal context in which the homicide takes place. Much has
been written on the inadequacy of legal responses to conjugal violence; 5
for example, Edwards writes:
What is the basis of the prevailing view that spousal violence is a family affair, a private
matter rarely if ever to be regulated or interfered with by the law, the police or the
public? Can law-makers and enforcers and the police in particular justify their traditional
complacency, or is this apparent resignation evidence of institutionalized misogyny, since
it is undeniably the case that the victims of domestic violence are most often women-
cohabitees, girlfriends, wives, daughters and mothers-and the aggressors are men-
boyfriends, husbands, fathers and sons. Given this sex divide between aggressors and
victims, it would not be illogical to interpret the treatment of both offenders and victims
by the criminal justice system as misogynist, too, if too simplistic.6
This criticism of the legal system's responses to conjugal violence
is well founded. First, it is clear from both official statistics and research
studies that women (cohabitees, wives, girlfriends and so on) constitute
the vast majority of victims of violence within the home.7 When men are
5 G. Fraser, "Taking Spousal Assault Seriously: A Philosophical View of Legal Contradiction"
(1985) 5 Windsor Y.B. Access Just 368.
6 S. Edwards, Policing "Domestic" Vitolence (London: Sage, 1989) at 1.
7 See the statistics released by the Home Office on 17 October 1991 on Domestic Homicide,
relating to those homicides committed between 1982 and 1989; also considered by L Smith for the
Home Office, Domestic Volence." An Overview of the Literature, Home Office Research Study no. 107
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989). See also E. Stanko, Everyday Violence (London:
Pandora, 1990); LK. Weisman, Discrimination by Design: A Feminist Critique of the Man-made
Environment (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992); R.J. Gelles & J.R. Conte, "Domestic
Violence and Sexual Abuse of Children: A Review of Research in the Eighties" (1990) 52 J.
Marriage & Faro. 1045; A. C6, La rage au coeur Rapport de recherche surle traitement judiciaire de
l'homicide conjugal au Qulec (Baie-Comeau: Regroupement des femmes de la COte-Nord, 1991);
D. Finkelhor et aL, The Dark Side of Families (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); J.E. Stets, "Verbal and
Physical Aggression in Marriage" (1990) 52 J. Marriage & Fain. 501; and M.A. Straus & G.T.
Hotaling, eds., The Social Causes of Husband-Wife VTolence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
[VOL 31 NO. 4
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victims of violence, they have often acted as primary aggressor, by
initiating the violence to which the woman responds.8
Furthermore, it is clear from an examination of the options
available to the battered woman that the legal system does not appear to
have as a priority the provision of effective solutions to her problems.
Historical analyses support the argument that this is a long-standing
phenomenon in legal practice. In England, women who experience
conjugal violence have several options available to them: calling the
police during an attack; asking for an injunction such as a
non-molestation order (under the Domestic Violence Matrimonial
Proceedings Act l o or the Domestic Proceedings Magistrates' Courts Act1');
leaving the relationship, perhaps initiating proceedings for divorce or
judicial separation; and going to a women's shelter or refuge for
assistance.
The poor quality of most of these options is by now well known:
for example, the police may respond more slowly to a call for assistance
from a woman in her own home than they would to a street fight
between strangers, or they may not respond at allj 2 The police may
refuse to arrest the aggressor, claiming that the woman is likely to refuse
to press charges, or that their role is to cool down the argument rather
Press, 1980).
8 Weisman maps the territories of violence and victimization in the home: women are most
often victimized in the bedroom; when they retaliate, it is most often in the kitchen, ibid. at 100-01.
9 See N. Tomes, "A 'Torrent of Abuse': Crimes of Violence Between Working-Class Men and
Women in London, 1840-1875" (1977) L of Social History 328; L Gordon, Heroes of Their Own
Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence, Boston 1880-1960 (New York. Viking, 1988); C.
Backhouse, "'Pure Patriarchy': Nineteenth-Century Canadian Marriage" (1986) 31 McGill U. 264;
A. Clark, "Humanity or justice? Wifebeating and the law in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries" in C. Smart, ed., Regulating womanhood. Rfstorical essays on mraniage, motherhood and
sexuait (London: Routledge, 1992) 187 [hereinafter Regulating Womanhood]; E. Ross, "'Fierce
Questions and Taunts': Married Life in Working Class London, 1870-1914" (1982) 8 Feminist Stud.
575; E. Pleck, "Feminist Responses to 'Crimes Against Women', 1868-1896" (1983) 8 Signs 451
[hereinafter "Feminist Responses"]; E. Pleck, Domestic 7yranny: he Making of Social PolicyAgainst
Family Vwlence from Colonial Tunes to the Prent (New York. Oxford University Press, 1987) at
182-225; and M.E. Doggett, Maniage, Wife-Beating and the Law in Victorian England (Columbia,
South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
10 [1976] c. 50.
11 [1978] c. 22.
12 The inadequacies of police performance are documented in A. Bourlet, Police Intervention
in Marital Violence (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990); M.D.A. Freeman, Violence in the
Home (London: Croom Helm, 1979) [hereinafter Vwlence]; M.D.A. Freeman, "Legal Ideologies,
Patriarchal Precedents and Domestic Violence" in MD.A. Freeman, ed., State, Law and the Family
(London: Macmillan, 1984) [hereinafter State]; Edwards, supra note 6; RE. Dobash & R.P. Dobash,
Women, Violence and Social Change (New York. Routledge, 1992); and J. Hanmer & M. Maynard,
eds., Women, Pwolence and Social Control (London: Macmillan, 1987).
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than remove the aggressor from the home.'3 It has also been shown that
a woman who calls the police during an attack risks severe violence: her
partner may escalate the violence against her if he discovers her call to
the police. 1 4 Similarly, a woman who attempts to obtain an injunction
risks increased violence. Injunctions are notoriously difficult to enforce.
If a man wants to injure his partner, an injunction is unlikely to stop
him.15 Leaving the abusive man can be enormously difficult: the
problems faced by a battered woman who leaves an abusive relationship
may include housing difficulties,/ 6 financial troubles,17 the need to
provide care for children, and-not least-the difficulty of accepting
that a loved one is violent and will not reform his behaviour.18 Finally,
going to a women's refuge may be impossible or difficult depending on
its location. Even if a shelter does exist in her area, there may not be a
vacancy; shelters are under-funded and under-resourced, and many have
to turn women away.19
It should be clear that there are very few effective remedies that
can be sought by a battered woman. For her, all avenues of response are
dangerous, difficult or uncertain. The legal system appears to manifest
13 See Bourlet, ibid; Freeman, tolence, ibia; and Edwards, supra note 6 at 100ft.
14 See Tomes, supra note 9; L Kelly, Surviving Sexual Vwolence (Cambridge: Polity, 1988);
Bourlet, supra note 12; andR v. Donachie (1982), 4 Cr. App. R. 378 [hereinafter Donache].
15 As in Donachie, supra. Donachie's wife, in fear for her life, obtained an injunction against
him. Donachie had been in prison when she wrote to him, telling him that she had begun an affair
with a sixteen-year-old youth. The day after his release, despite the injunction against him,
Donachie went to the matrimonial home, threw the youth out, and threatened him with a knife. The
next day, he returned and found his wife and her lover in bed together. Both left the home.
Donachie tracked them down. The spouses were left alone together, they argued; his wife said that
she wanted nothing to do with him and spat in his face. He stabbed her twenty-nine times. Donachie
was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation by his deceased wife. See also L
McCann, "Battered Women and the Law: The Limits of the Legislation" in C. Smart & J. Brophy,
eds, Women-in-law (London: Routledge, 1985), and Edwards, supra note 6.
1 6 Edwards, supra note 6 at 154-55.
1 7 j. Pad, ed., Private Vrolence and Public Policy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).
D.S. Kalmuss & MA. Straus, in their article "Wife's Marital Dependency and Wife Abuse" (1982)
44 J. Marriage & Faro. 277, state that it is economic, not psychological, dependency which keeps
women in abusive relationships.
18 T.B. Herbert et aL, "Coping with an Abusive Relationship: How and Why do Women
Stay?" (1991) 53 J. Marriage & Farn. 311; S.L Miller & S.S. Simpson, "Courtship Violence and
Social Control: Does Gender Matter?" (1991) 25 L&S. Rev. 355; and E. Pizzey & J. Shapiro,
"Choosing a Violent Relationship" (1981) 56/962 New Society 133. Pizzey's argument that some
women are masochistically motivated to remain has been fiercely contested: see Edwards, supra
note 6 at 166.
19 Weisman recounts the history of the building of a shelter in St. Paul, Minnesota, supra note
7 at 102-05.
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disdain for the battered woman's situation. Women who do receive
some kind of assistance often seem to fit into the category of "good wife
and mother."20 While the crude opposition between "good" and "bad"
women is one that feminist criticism seeks to go beyond, legal practices
often appear to follow exactly such an opposition. It is not my intention
to argue for a simplistic analysis of legal discourse and practice; rather,
my contention is that the opposition between "good" and "bad" women
does operate within the juridical system. Its complex operation is bound
up with the legal construction of other elements, such as the opposition
between reason and unreason, justice and vengeance, victim and
aggressor.
In contrast to Edwards who stated that violence between
intimates is a matter "rarely if ever to be regulated or interfered with by
the law,"21 it is my argument that the law has created its own culture of
violence, in which the form and nature of violence is regulated and
structured by legal practice. The following section will deal with the
defences that could be raised against a charge of murder, when a
battered woman has killed her abuser. In considering the defences
available, it should be borne in mind that the options available to the
woman before the point at which lethal force is used (that is, the
possibility of leaving the relationship, calling the police, getting an
injunction and so on) are of limited effectiveness. To forget this, as
many commentators do,22 is to augment the problems faced by battered
women.
20 The case of Ruth Brown Snyder as an archetypal "bad" woman is examined by A. Jones in
Women who Ill (New York: Fawcett Colombine, 1981) at 260-66. Ruth Brown Snyder, born in
Manhattan in 1895, married a violent man. She began an affair with another man; soon after, her
husband was murdered, apparently in a burglary (staged by her lover). She was convicted of murder
and executed. The press coverage of the case made much of her adultery and vilified her as a
betrayal of womanhood. Gordon discusses this dichotomy in its historical form in .supra note 9 at
253, 267. Smart analyzes the legal construction of the "bad" mother in "Disruptive bodies and
unruly sex: The regulation of reproduction and sexuality in the nineteenth century" in Regulating
womanhood, supra note 9 at 7. In A.M. Smith, "A Symptomology of an Authoritarian Discourse"
(1990) 10 New Formations 41, the author demonstrates the evolution of such a dichotomy as
symptomatic of fundamental ruptures in the apparently smooth surface of discursive practices.
21 Edwards, supra note 6 at 1.
22 See Pizzey & Shapiro, supra note 18; and N. Shainess, "Vulnerability to Violence:
Masochism as Process" (1979) 33 Am. J. of Psychotherapy 174.
1993] 767
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II. DEFENCES IN ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW FOR BATTERED
WOMEN WHO KILL THEIR ABUSERS
A. Provocation
Provocation is pleaded fairly often by battered women as a
defence to a murder charge. I will discuss this defence in some detail,
since in many ways it represents the most likely area for reform23
Provocation as a defence to a charge of murder reduces it to a conviction
for manslaughter. At common law, the so-called "classic direction"
comes from the judgment of Devlin J. in R v. Duffy,24 in which he stated:
Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which
would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and
temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him
or her for the moment not master of his [or her] mind.25
The rule represented by this statement was modified by section 3
of the Homicide Act 1957,26 which emphasized that the provocative act
might be physical or verbal, and that the issue of whether or not "a
reasonable man" would have been provoked by such an act be left to the
jury. It leaves untouched Devlin J.'s use of the wording "sudden and
temporary." As such, the section assumes that the test for provocation,
as determined by the jury, has two parts: first, whether the defendant
was provoked to lose her or his self-control; and secondly, whether a
reasonable man would have been provoked to act as the defendant did.
Smith and Hogan describe the first part as subjective and the second as
objective2 7
2 3 For example, G. Williams, "Domestic Provocation and the Ivory Tower" (1992) N.LJ. 381,
and the Ashley Bil!, which did not pass into legislation.
24 [1949] 1 All E.R. 932 [hereinafterDuff,].
25 /bia at 932.
26 (U.K.), 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11.
27j. Smith & B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992) at 351-52. I will
refer to Smith and Hogan's text with some frequency in the discussion that follows; I am taking it as
exemplifying the doctrinal text that sees criminal law as a collection of rules and more or less correct
interpretations.
768 [VOL 31 No. 4
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1. The subjective element
The first part of the defence of provocation, determining
whether the defendant was provoked to lose self-control, is seen as a
question of fact. Smith and Hogan state that the jury should be able to
consider
all the relevant circumstances; the nature of the provocative act and all the relevant
conditions in which it took place, the sensitivity or otherwise of [the defendant] and the
time, if any, which elapsed between the provocation and the act which caused death.28
At first reading, it might appear that the law of provocation
should be able to encapsulate the specific position of the battered
woman within the stated concern and to consider all relevant conditions
and circumstances and the nature of the provocative act. However, it
will be demonstrated that the apparently all-encompassing nature of the
subjective element of provocation actually operates to exclude the
battered woman from utilizing the defence. I will consider four separate
aspects of the subjective element, using the terms employed by Smith
and Hogan: a) "the nature of the provocative act," b) "all the relevant
circumstances of the act," c) "the sensitivity or otherwise of the accused"
at the time of the act, and d) "the time, if any, which elapsed between
the provocation and the act which caused death."29
a) The nature of the provocative act
Battered women often resort to lethal force after prolonged
victimization by their partners 3 0 For some women, this means suffering
abuse over several years. Feminist critics have expressed concern about
whether judicial understanding of the nature of the provocative act
includes all of these very long periods of abuse, or arbitrarily divides
28 /bia at 354.
29rbid.
30 The pattern of the commission of lethal violence by battered women is set out by K.
O'Donovan in "Defences for Battered Women who Kill" (1991) 18 J.L & Soc'y 219 [hereinafter
"Defences"], and Edwards, supra note 6 at 128.
1993] 769
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them into shorter periods, examining only the most recent battering31
In their discussion of Thornton, Smith and Hogan state:
The fact that provocative behaviour has continued over a long period does not rule out
the defence, provided it has culminated in a sudden explosion. The prolonged nature of
the provocation may explain why an incident, trivial when considered in isolation, caused
a loss of self-control 32
There are three criticisms that can be made of this statement.
First, Smith and Hogan's confident assertion that long-term battering is
included within the definition of "provocative act" would seem to have
no foundation in the case-law? 3 Indeed, in Thornton, it is strikingly
apparent that the Court of Appeal showed no willingness to include
Thornton's experiences over many months. The Court concentrated
almost exclusively on the events of the night that Thornton resorted to
lethal force. Her experiences of violence from the deceased are
mentioned as part of the historical build-up to that night, but not as
having anything to do with what provoked her to stab her husband. 34
The statement in R. v. Davies,3 5 that it would be too generous to take
account of the deceased's course of conduct throughout the whole year
preceding the homicide, was cited with approval in Thornton.3 6
The second criticism that can be made of Smith and Hogan's
statement relates to the characterization of some incidents as "trivial
when considered in isolation." This shows a very great disregard for the
actual situation of the woman who is being battered. Accounts given by
these women show that no incident can be considered trivial; each event
is potentially life-threatening.37 Research supports these accounts. In
31 See M. Fox, "Provocation and the Criminal Law" (Address to the Critical Legal Conference
on Representation, September 1991)[unpublished]; A. Young, "Feminity as Marginalia" in S.
McVeigh, P. Rush & A. Young, eds., Ctiminal Legal Practices (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
forthcoming); Edwards, supra note 6; and O'Donovan, "Defences," supra note 30.
32 Smith & Hogan, supra note 27 at 355.
33 See Duffy, supra note 24 and Thomton, supra note 3.
34 Thornton, supra note 3 at 312 and at 314.
35 [1975], 1 All E.R. 890.
36 Supra note 3 at 314.
3 7 See the accounts given by S. Thornton, "Why I Killed my Husband" (April 1992) Women's
Journal 100, and of Jane Stafford in B. Vallee, Life with Bi/ly (Toronto: Seal Books, 1986). Jane
Hurshman married Billy Stafford and suffered many years of extreme violence at his hands. He also
abused their children. He was well known as a violent alcoholic among his family and the local
community. Jane Stafford shot him with a rifle at close range while he was unconscious from
alcohol in his van. He had ordered her not to move until he woke up. Charged with first-degree
murder (under her father-in-laws name of Whynot), she was acquitted on grounds of self-defence,
[VOL 31 No. 4
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Edwards' study, after alcohol, which was attributed to 33 per cent of
cases of spousal violence, "anything" was cited as the most frequent
cause of a violent incident 38 When "anything" can produce a violent
response in the woman's partner, no incident should be considered
trivial. Although the authors insert a disclaimer that their perspective
can help to understand why an apparently trivial incident has greater
seriousness, its characterization as trivial in any way shows a lack of
sensitivity towards the battered woman? 9
The final criticism relates to the insistence on the need for a
"sudden explosion" as culmination of the provocation. This perfectly
exemplifies the masculine model of emotion that characterizes juridical
debate about provocation. As Edwards notes: "Defences to homicide
are founded on particular versions of typical people and typical
situations. These ... are very much predicated on violent behaviour
which men consider reasonable, and exclude women's definitions of
motive."40
The "particular versions" are masculine ones, with emphasis on
masculine metaphors of temperature, speed, and pressure.41 Another
expression used is "the heat of the moment" which is always
counterposed, explicitly or implicitly, to murder "in cold blood." Anger
is said to "build up." The effect is to establish that the loss of control
was out of the individual's control. Provocation, in this
conceptualization, lights a fuse which can ignite violence. Just as the
lighting of fuses and the exploding bomb are tropes which feature in
male action movies which exclude the perspectives of women, this
characterization of anger does not include the emotions experienced by
many battered women.
When a battered woman kills her abuser, it is likely that her act
will conform in most respects to the following pattern: she will use a
weapon of some kind (fuel, a knife, an axe), and she will walt until he is
even though no assault was under way or imminent when she killed Stafford. The Crown appealed
the decision, and a new trial was ordered (R v. Whynou(1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (N.S.C.A.)). Jane
Stafford pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two
years' probation.
38 Edwards, supra note 6 at 171.
39 The authors also imply that the incident in the case of Thornton (a discussion of which
frames the authors' comments here) was a trivial one. The incident in question involved the
deceased, who had battered his wife severely over several months, telling her that she was a whore
and threatening to kill her at a later point. Such an incident should not be characterized as trivial.
40 Edwards, supra note 6 at 181.
41 For example, Smith and Hogan write of the loss of self-control as a "sudden explosion,"
employing metaphors of speed and pressure. Interestingly, the male orgasm is often characterized
as involving a similar "sudden explosion."
1993]
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asleep or drunk, perhaps many hours after the last provocative act, as it
is understood by legal doctrine.42 This pattern is perfectly logical:
women are generally smaller than men, and the law's notion of an equal
fight between unarmed combatants could not easily apply to a man and a
woman. It is extremely difficult for women to resort to violence: women
are socialized against the use of force, in contrast to most men's
experience of the legitimized use of force at some point in their life. It is
particularly difficult for women to resort to force when they are forced
to act violently against their chosen romantic partner. If the woman has
previously been assaulted by her partner, she will know too well what
injuries he can inflict upon her. Waiting until the man is asleep or
intoxicated may be the only way of using force against him without
risking death or serious injury. Studies show that, when women did use
force against their violent partners, the result was usually an escalation
of violence against the women. 43
The law appears to characterize violent acts resulting from a
sudden loss of self-control as naturally more acceptable than violence
which arises when self-control is lost in any other way. Although acts in
the former category also have to be considered under other aspects of
the doctrine of provocation, a defendant who can claim that the violence
occurred when self-control was lost in an instant will have an advantage
over anyone who has to admit to a less than immediate loss of control. I
would argue that the former category is more likely to include male
defendants than female. The insistence of the courts and doctrinal
commentators upon the masculine model of emotion outlined above will
contribute to the successful use of the defence by a majority of male
defendants. The judicial and doctrinal interpretation of "the nature of
the provocative act" ensures that battered women, in most situations, are
excluded from pleading provocation as a defence to a murder charge.
b) All the relevant circumstances of the act
This expression appears to manifest openness in legal doctrine, a
willingness to consider different aspects of the situation and to include,
rather than to exclude. However, it is my argument that exclusion is
achieved by the deployment of the term "relevant." Legal discourse,
whether expressed by the judiciary or in a doctrinal text, is remarkable
for its use of a self-proclaimed neutral language which is far from neutral
42 The homicides by both Thornton and Ahluwalia conformed to this pattern.
43 Edwards, supra note 6.
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(just as no discourse could ever be).44 "Relevant" circumstances are
those deemed so by the court. This may mean that the battered woman
is not allowed to express her fears about her possible death at the
victim's hands, because the incidents did not fit the canonical definition
instituted by Devlin J. in Duffy. It can also mean that the judge will
describe the circumstances of the act in such a way as to structure its
interpretation. In Thornton, the trial judge stated:
Members of the jury, ... even if Mrs Thornton had lost her self-control, you would still
have to ask whether a reasonable woman in her position would have done what she did
and, if you think (and this is for you to say) that she went out and found a knife and went
back into the room and as a result of something said to her stabbed her husband as he lay
defenceless on that settee deep into his stomach, it may be very difficult to come to the
conclusion that that was, and I use the shorthand, a reasonable reaction.45
To describe the deceased as defenceless requires that the
perspective of the battered woman be completely suppressed. Since
Sara Thornton had experienced her husband's violence many times, she
knew that he was capable of injuring or killing her, especially when
drunk, as he was that night. The jury has, therefore, been presented with
a highly coded scenario: the defenceless husband and the wife as primary
aggressor. Even when framed within a hypothesis, as in the judge's
summing-up, such a scenario would have had a considerable effect on
the jury's reading of the events described to them. In these ways, legal
discourse operates to exclude the battered woman's perspective and to
ensure that "relevance" is defined in a manner contrary to her interests.
c) The sensitivity of the accused
The courts in England have so far shown little or no willingness
to hear evidence as to the effect that the experience of being battered
can have upon a woman. In January 1992, the barrister Helena Kennedy
attempted to adduce evidence that the defendant, Sally Emery, was
suffering from "battered woman syndrome" (Bws). Emery was charged
with failing to prevent her child from being killed by her husband, a man
who had been battering both child and wife for a period of years. The
jury did not accept that Bws had any relevance to the case and found the
44 p. Goodrich, LegalDiscour= Studie in Linguistics, Rhertoic and LegalAnalysis (New York*
St. Martin's Press, 1987) at 206.
4 5 Tornton, supra note 3 at 312, quoted on appeal by Beldam U.
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woman guilty. She was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. 46 On
appeal, Emery's sentence was reduced to thirty months' imprisonment,
on the grounds that the trial judge had not given enough weight to the
expert evidence relating to the trauma suffered by Emery as an abused
woman.4 7 The re-trial of Ahluwalia for manslaughter on grounds of
diminished responsibility is seen by many as opening the judicial door to
the admission of evidence about BWS in future cases.4
BWS originated in the United States in the 1970s. In 1979, the
categories "battered spouse" and "battered woman" were added to the
International Classification of Diseases: Clinical Modification Scheme.49
Bws is most closely associated with Dr. L Walker, a psychologist who has
acted as expert witness on Bws in many American cases and who works
as a therapist with battered women. For Walker, battered women
exhibit a series of behaviours that have been categorized as part of
"learned helplessness," a concept developed by M. Seligman in
experiments with dogs. The dogs were subjected to electric shocks; their
initial attempts to avoid pain being fruitless, the animals developed
passive and helpless behaviour.5 0 According to Walker, battered women
develop passive and helpless behaviour in ways similar to Seligman's
dogs. 1
The appeal of BWS in North America undoubtedly has to do with
its purporting to answer many of the popular hard questions that are
asked about battered women. It can explain why women do not leave
their abusers (once helplessness is learned, leaving seems impossible); it
46 This case and its appeal are unreported. It is discussed by defence counsel H. Kennedy in
her bookEve was Framed" Women and British Justice (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992) at 96. See
also A. Phillips, "The abuse that paralyses" The Guardian (28 January 1992) 16.
47 Judgment was given by Lord Taylor, CJ., who, four months earlier, had heard Ahluwalla's
appeal against the murder conviction. See D. Pallister, "Battered woman has jail term cut" The
Guardian (4 November 1992) 8; and L Mills, "Guilty of staying silent" The Independen on Sunday
(6 December 1992) 20.
48 C. Dyer, "Battered wife ruling a landmark, say lawyers" The Guanian (26 September 1992)
3.
49 See "'Battered Syndrome' now official" (1979) 3 Response 3; and Dobash & Dobash, supra
note 12 at 213ff.
50 M. Seligman, "Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog" (1965) J. of Abnormal
Psychology 256. Seligman also notes that the dogs developed pain reduction techniques, such as
rolling in their faeces in order to lessen the conduction of the electricity.
5 1 L. Walker, The Battered Woman (New York. Harper and Row, 1979); L. Walker, "The
Psychological Impact of the Criminalization of Domestic Violence on Victims" (1985) 10
Victimology 281; and L Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill and How Society
Responds (New York. Harper and Row, 1987) [hereinafter TernifyingLove].
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can explain why a battered woman may stay with her abuser for years
(violence occurs in a cycle, alternating with blissful "honeymoon"
periods in which the abuser swears to reform, brings gifts to the woman,
and acts like a "model husband"); it makes sense of some baffling
aspects of the cases, such as many women's refusal to believe that their
abusers were dead after the homicide (the man has by then taken on an
aura of omnipotence). 52
BWS has many critics,5 3 and its popularity in North America54
should not be taken as underwriting its value. Its acceptance could easily
fit into the pathologizing of women's experiences that has already
occurred in relation to "premenstrual syndrome (PMS).'"5 (I will discuss
in detail the dangers of accepting BWS in section VI, B and C.) However,
the refusal on the part of the courts in England to admit evidence about
BWS or any other theory about battered women's experiences and likely
state of mind manifests a lack of interest which is tantamount to another
form of violence against battered women. Far from inquiring into the
"sensitivity or otherwise" of battered women as defendants in
provocation cases, as Smith and Hogan claim, the courts refuse to accept
that there is any uniqueness or specificity in battered women's
experience and treat battered women under the same generic standards
as the man in a street fight or an isolated argument between strangers.
It should be clear, and it should be accepted by the courts, that the
battered woman is indeed in a unique position (approximated only by
the victims of rape by an intimate or victims of child abuse): her trust in
another individual has been violated; her belief in promises to reform
52 Stafford's experiences, as recounted by Vallee, supra note 37, support this. See also the
stories in Walker, Terrifying Love, sumpra note 51.
53 See, for example, E. Schneider, "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battery" (1986) 9 Women's Rts. L Rep. 195; Dobash &
Dobash, supra note 12; A.-M. Boisvert, "Lgitime d6fense et le 'syndrome de la femme battue': R. c.
LavaMe" (1991) 36 McGill LU. 191; Comack, "Legal Recognition," supra note 1; E. Comack,
"Women Defendants and the 'Battered Wife Syndrome': A Plea for the Sociological Imagination"
(1987) 5 Crown Coun. Rev. 6 [hereinafter "Women Defendants"]; and A. Young, "Crime and the
Body: A Postmodem Reading" (Address to the Law and Society Association Meeting, May 1992)
[unpublished].
54 For example, its use in State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d. 364 (NJ. 1984), 97 NJ. 178 (1984)
[hereinafter Ke/y].
55 The major proponent of the existence of Pms is K. Dalton: "Menstruation and Crime"
(1961) 1 British Med. J. 326, and The Premenstrual Syndrome and Progesterone Therapy (London:
Heinemann, 1977) [hereinafter The Premenstral Syndrome]. For a critical assessment of the
discursive formulation relating to Psis, see H. Allen, "At the Mercy of Her Hormones: Premenstrual
Tension and the Law" in P. Adams & E. Cowie, eds, The Woman in Question: MIF (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) [hereinafter "At the Mercy of Her Hormones"].
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has been shattered again and again; her family life is falling apart; she
may have to accept that her children's father is violent and dangerous;
and she may have no practical solutions to the problems of finance,
housing, and unemployment.
It is my contention that these factors should be considered
automatically in any case where a battered woman has committed
homicide. If this were done, it would go some way toward examining
"the sensitivity or otherwise of the defendant." At the moment, judges
appear to be moving in the opposite direction, showing no
understanding or interest in examining the problems faced by battered
women and acting instead to compound them. The trial judge in
Thornton, in his direction to the jury, stated:
There are ... many unhappy, indeed miserable, husbands and wives. It is a fact of life. It
has to be faced, members of the jury. But on the whole it is hardly reasonable, you may
think,'to stab them fatally when there are other alternatives available, like walking out or
going upstairs.
5 6
Until the judiciary accept the need to respond more sympathetically to
the situation of battered women, this kind of comment will appear again
and again.
d) Lapse of time between the provocation and the homicidal act
At this point in the elaboration of the doctrine of provocation, it
becomes essential that the loss of self-control experienced by the
defendant occur immediately or very soon after the deceased's
provocative act. Any delay creates what has become known as the
"cooling-off period," in which the defendant is presumed to be able to
reflect on what has happened and, if a reasonable man, to decide against
taking action. If, after reflection in this cooling-off period, the
defendant proceeds with the lethal act, it is presumed that any homicide
which results is due to an intention to kill or cause serious harm.
Provocation cannot be pleaded; there was no sudden loss of self-control.
The case of lbrams5 7 is important here. The defendant had been
regularly abused by the deceased. She arranged an attack with the help
of others. Almost a week had passed since the last act of abuse by the
deceased, when he was attacked and killed. Ibrams pleaded
provocation. The court held that, however terrible her experiences, a
56 Thonton, supra note 3 at 312, Beldam LI.. quoting the trial judge's charge to the jury.
5 7 [1982] 74 Cr. App. R. 154.
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five-day cooling-off period, during which the attack had been planned
with care, vitiated any possible defence of provocation. The planning
and the lapse of time implied an intention to kill. Smith and Hogan cite
Thornton as an example of "a generous interpretation of this element of
the defence."5 8 The authors seem surprised that the judge allowed
provocation even to be considered by the jury, given what they see as the
relevant facts: that Thornton had earlier declared her intention to kill
her husband; that, after his provocative statements and threats, she had
gone into the kitchen, sharpened a knife, returned to the room, and
stabbed him.
The considerable weight given to Thornton's declared "intention
of killing her husband" by Smith and Hogan and by the Court of Appeal
is dubious and reveals an inadequate understanding of the battered
woman's position. Walker, in her profile of battered women who kill,
writes:
Few state later that they ever intended to kill; all say that they simply wanted to stop him
from ever hurting them like that again. Almost every battered woman tells of wishing, at
some point, that the batterer were dead, maybe even of fantasizing how he might die.
These wishes and fantasies are normal, considering the extraordinary injustice these
women suffer at their men's hands.5 9
Whether or not we accept such a statement outright, it would seem right
that the appalling conditions inflicted upon battered women require
profound reflection on the meaning of any statements appearing to
express homicidal intent. Thornton's statement to a friend, that she
thought she would have to kill her husband in order to end the violence
she suffered, can be read as recognizing the inadequacy of so-called
"reasonable alternatives," such as divorce or leaving the batterer (the
statement was made in the middle of a conversation about the difficulty
of obtaining a divorce). It may have indicated the development of a
homicidal plan; it is equally possible, however, that it indicated her
despair at the options available to a battered woman. It should certainly
not remove from a battered woman the possibility of pleading a defence
such as provocation.
Smith and Hogan characterize Thornton's killing of her husband
as marked by a lapse of time, during which she fetched and sharpened
the knife, between the provocative incident and her stabbing him. This
would also characterize the way that the incident was presented to the
jury. It is, however, possible to read the facts differently. Thornton
58 Supra note 27 at 356.
59 Walker, Terrifying Love, supra note 51 at 106.
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claimed that she spoke to her husband in order to persuade him to come
to bed. He was lying on the sofa in a drunken state. He called her a
whore, accused her of selling her body, and told her that he would give
her no more money and that he would kill her as she had been out with
other men. She was upset by these insults. She remembered being
advised by Alcoholics Anonymous to stay calm and to make sure she was
protected if he attacked her. In this spirit, she went to the kitchen, got
the knife, sharpened it, and returned to the sofa. She repeated her
request that he come to bed with her; he repeated the insults and said
that he would kill her while she slept. She asked him once more to come
to bed. He made no move; she raised the knife and stabbed him.
I would argue that the focus could have been considerably
narrowed by the court, to examine the statements of the deceased and
the actions of the accused after she returned with the knife. Any
assumption that getting the knife indicated formation of homicidal
intent should be questioned in the light of her previous experiences
which led to severe injury and the advice given that she should protect
herself against his attacks. If the frame is thus narrowed, the jury would
have to consider whether the deceased's insults, threat to kill her, and
silence in the face of her entreaty could have constituted provocation.
Her fetching the knife should be interpreted in the light of his having
already having said that he would kill her for, as he thought, having gone
out with other men. The supposed lapse of time becomes insignificant.
In commenting on the conviction of Ahluwalia for manslaughter due to
diminished responsibility in her recent re-trial, Horder states that, in
relation to provocation, now "it doesn't matter if you don't act in haste,
but you still have to act in hot blood."' 0 This seems an over-optimistic
reading of the effect of Ahluwalia's re-trial, since the judgment given, in
her appeal against conviction for murder, by the Lord Chief Justice in
July 1992 is at pains to emphasize that the main ground for allowing her
appeal related to the medical evidence as to her diminished
responsibility which, though available at the time of the trial, had not
been seen by the defence counsel. It would seem to be too soon to
celebrate the complete reinterpretation of this aspect of the law on
provocation.
60 Quoted in Dyer, supra note 48.
[VOL 31 No. 4
Conjugal Homicide
2. The objective element
The second part of the defence of provocation is viewed as
involving an objective question: would a reasonable man/person have
done as the defendant did? Let us return here to the comment made by
the trial judge in Thornton about whether it was more reasonable for the
defendant to fatally stab her husband or to go upstairs ("why do they
stay? they could always leave if they didn't like/deserve it"). In the
summing-up for the jury, the trial judge thus used mistaken but
commonplace notions about battered women to suggest to the jury that
Thornton's action may not have been reasonable. Given a direction such
as this, it comes as no surprise that the jury found provocation did not
exist in Thornton's case.
The objective question in provocation was formulated in terms of
whether "the reasonable man" would have done as the defendant did.
The Camplin61 case is accepted as having had a liberalizing influence
upon this doctrine. Lord Simon suggested that the reasonable man is to
be construed as having the age, sex, and characteristics of the accused.
Lord Simon stated: "A 'reasonable woman' with her sex eliminated is
altogether too abstract a notion for my comprehension or, I am
confident, for that of any jury."62 Allen notes that here Lord Simon is
confronting the unthinkable-the rationality of woman:
Having first stated that the term 'a reasonable man' is to include in principle 'a
reasonable woman', the law lord continues by explaining that even though the two are
thus covered by the same term, they must necessarily remain conceptually distinct, since
the lack of that conceptual division is literally unthinkable ... a reasonable human subject
not identified by sex.O
3
The judiciary and various commentators have since then made certain
pronouncements about how the notion "reasonable man" naturally
includes within it the concept of "the reasonable woman."64
It is clear that the assumed correctness of this statement, and
others like it, is extremely problematic. As I have argued above,
women's experiences are being assessed according to a model more
suited to a fight in the street between two men at pub-closing time (or
other such situations). Women's experiences of being battered by their
61 D.P. v. Camplin [1978], 2 All E.R. 168.
62 bid. at 180.
63 H. Allen, Justice Unbalanced: Gnder Psychiatry and Judicial Decisions (Philadelphia- Open
University Press, 1987) at 31 [hereinafter Justice Unbalanced.
64 For example, J. Smith, "Commentary on R. v. Thomton" (1992) Crim. L Rev. 54 at 55.
1993] 779
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
lovers and husbands are not addressed by or contained within the notion
of "the reasonable man." Indeed, it could be said that judicial and
doctrinal interpretation of the concept "reasonable man" has legitimated
the battering of women.65 Many feminist critics have argued that the
history of criminal law is one of indifference to the claims of women who
have been victimized by men (whether through rape or other forms of
violence). 66 It is disingenuous to suggest that a notion such as the
"reasonable man" could have any meaning for women who have killed
their abusers.
Women who plead provocation as a defence to a murder charge
face the enormous obstacle of the legal construction of reason within
marriage. While men have been allowed to assault and sometimes (far
more frequently than women do) kill their partners, women are always
constructed as already victimized within the relationship. Victimization,
within legal discourse, is woman's destiny.67 The battered woman who
kills is explicitly rejecting that destiny and is perceived as attempting to
usurp the position of dominance which is reserved for men in marriage.
We can see this discourse at work in the following instances. First, in
Thornton, the trial judge describes the deceased as "defenceless." He
also refers to miserable marriages as being "a fact of life." This accords
to the violent marriage the immutable nature of, for example, the daily
facts of dawn and dusk. While some battered women are forced to
believe that killing their abuser is the only possible way out of their
situation, the judge implies that almost anything else would have been
more reasonable. Secondly, in the trial of Valerie Flood for
manslaughter,68 the judge said: "there are many other courses open to
65 Such as the cases McGrail and Singh; McGrail is unreported, but discussed in Kennedy,
supra note 46 at 205. Singh was covered in news reports: "Nagging provoked businessman to
strangle wife, court told" The Guardian (28 January 1992); and "Wife killer given suspended
sentence" The Independent (30 January 1992) 3.
6 6 Edwards, supra note 6; Smart, supra note 1; and R.E. Dobash & R.P. Dobash, "Wives: the
'Appropriate' Victims of Marital Violence" (1977-78) 2 Victimology 426.
6 7 Young, supra note 53, and A. Young & P. Rush, "The Law of Victimage in Urbane
Realism: Thinking Through Inscriptions of Violence" in D. Nelken, ed., The Future of Criminology
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1994) [forthcoming].
68 Valerie Flood was married to a man who frequently burned her and beat her with a
hammer, and who tried to strangle and stab her. She stabbed him seventeen times and was
convicted of manslaughter. This case is unreported, but is discussed in Edwards, supra note 6 at
180.
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[battered wives] ... they can leave, separate, take divorce proceedings or
seek legal help." 69
Violence within marriages is thus normalized by the judiciary, as
long as the violence is being done by the man to the woman. To this
extent, it would appear that the marriage licence is indeed a "hitting
licence." 70 The "reasonable man" is quite likely to beat his wife. It is
not, within the construction of the law, generally reasonable for a woman
to respond to that violence with lethal force. These, then, are the
difficulties that will face a battered woman who attempts to plead that
she was provoked into killing her abusive partner. The next section will
deal with the difficulties, if not impossibility, of pleading self-defence in
such a situation.
B. Self-Defence
There has been no case in English criminal law where a battered
woman has successfully pleaded that the homicide of her abuser was in
her self-defence. This seems counter-intuitive, since most of these
homicides occur during a beating by the abuser. Self-defence, therefore,
initially appears to constitute a likely explanation for the homicide.
However, judicial understanding of self-defence does not appear to
allow it as an option for battered women.
At common law, one is entitled to defend oneself against attack.
The general principle is that the law allows such force to be used as is
reasonable in the circumstances of the particular case; when an offence
requires mens rea, what is reasonable is to be judged in the light of the
circumstances as the accused believed them to be, whether reasonably or
not. It is not relevant that the defendant was mistaken.71 The defence is
proved, therefore, by asking whether the force that was used was
69 Cited in Edwards, supra note 6 at 179-80. It is ironic that such a statement appears in a case
that is considered to show a more lenient approach to a battered woman, in allowing a
manslaughter charge and resulting in a lower sentence: see "Heart of the Matter" (transcript of a
television programme on battered women who kill, 1991).
70 M.A. Straus, "The Marriage license as a Hitting license: Evidence from Popular Culture,
Law, and Social Science" in M.A Straus & G.T. Hotaling, eds., The Sodal Causes of Husband-Wife
iolence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980) 39. Straus is associated with the
proposition that "the marriage license is a hitting license;" however, since his claim was that it
licensed both men and women within marriage, his argument has met with much criticism. R.A.
Berk et a., "Mutual Combat and Other Family Violence Myths" in Finkelhor et al, supra note 7 at
207.
71 Smith & Hogan, supra note 27 at 252.
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reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant supposed them to be.
Note that the defendant is not required to
weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive action. If a jury thought
that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he
honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that
only reasonable defensive action had been taken. A jury will be told that the defence of
self-defence, where the evidence makes its raising possible, will only fail if the
prosecution show beyond doubt that what the accused did was not by way of
self-defence. 72
The case of Gladstone Williams73 is authority for the principle
that the accused is to be judged on the facts as he or she believed them
to be. This would seem to imply that if a battered woman kills her
abuser and pleads self-defence, the jury must examine what she believed
to be the circumstances at the time of her act. Battered women who kill
state that, at the time of the homicide, insofar as they had any clear
thought, it was often that they would be killed by the abuser (such was
the severity of the attacks they had just undergone or were still
experiencing). 74 As a general proposition, it would seem that battered
women, because of the nature of their experiences as battered women,
should be able to raise this defence. However, the lack of success
requires a deeper investigation into the legal construction of
self-defence.
1. Reasonable force
Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 196775 requires that force used
in the prevention of a crime be reasonable. Defence of oneself against
attack will almost always be able to be construed as preventing a crime
(the initial attack to which the self-defender responds). Thus, the court
is investigating, (1) the nature of the circumstances as the accused
believed them to be, and (2) the reasonableness of the force used in
those circumstances. According to Smith and Hogan, the question of
proportionality in that reasonableness is "somewhat speculative." 76
They cite the case of a butcher who repelled a robber with a butcher's
72 Lord Morris in Palmer v. R, [1971] 1 All E.R. 1077 at 1088.
73 (1984), Cr. App. Rep. 376, aff'd by the Privy Council inBedford v. R., [1987] 3 All E.R. 425.
74 Food reports this: see her story in "Heart of the Matter," supra note 69.
75 (U.K.), 1967, c. 58.
76 Supra note 27 at 254.
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knife: the man's defensive action (in preventing the robbery of his
takings) was described with approval by the coroner.77 However, the
examples cited above, in relation to the judicial reception of the
reasonableness of the battered woman's lethal act in provocation cases,
do not suggest that lethal force will be seen as an acceptable response to
the beating she is receiving or has just received. While the judiciary
remain convinced that force is not a reasonable option, it is not likely
that lethal force will be construed as reasonable in the circumstances
(even if the battered woman asserts her belief that her own death was
likely if she did not act). The judicial presumption of the
unreasonableness of lethal force used by women is one of the main
reasons why self-defence has not been successfully pleaded by a battered
woman in English criminal law.
2. The question of retreat
Smith and Hogan state that, instead of being a duty, retreat is
now simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether it was
necessary to use force and whether the force was reasonable.78 They
surmise that "[i]f the only reasonable course is to retreat, then it would
appear that to stand and fight must be to use unreasonable force. There
is, however, no rule of law that a person attacked is bound to run away if
he [sic] can." 79 It seems clear that, although the battered woman should
not be disqualified from the defence by virtue of this aspect, judicial
(lack of) understanding of her situation will require retreat instead of
the use of force.
In Thornton, the trial judge asked the jury to consider whether, in
the context of provocation, it was reasonable for the defendant to stab
her husband instead of leaving the room or going upstairs. No mention
was made of Thornton's previous unsuccessful attempts to retreat or
otherwise counter her husband's violence or threats of violence. In the
preceding ten months, she had contacted Alcoholics Anonymous for
information on how to deal with her husband's drunken violent rages,
she had called the police for assistance, and she had asked neighbours
for advice. Despite these efforts, she had been badly beaten many times.
Thornton claimed that, on the night that she stabbed her husband, she
77ibU
78 Ibid at 255-56.
79 bid. at 256.
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genuinely believed his threat to kill her. From her experience of the
ineffectiveness of the alternatives (calling the police, asking neighbours
for help), retreat seemed impossible. If Thornton had pleaded
self-defence, it seems unlikely that the courts would have accepted it.
3. Imminence of the attack
Within doctrinal interpretation of the law of self-defence, there
is a perceived need for the attack to be imminent before the
self-defensive response can legitimately occur. If a gun is pointed or a
knife raised to stab, the imminence of the attack seems obvious. Valerie
Flood, who, after stabbing him seventeen times, was convicted of the
manslaughter of her violent and alcoholic husband, describes the event
as follows:
So as he was coming at me with the knife, I got both my hands round his arm, and I was
squeezing, so that he'd let go of the knife, so that I could get rid of it, and um he wouldn't
use it on me. But as it happens, I snapped, because I said this to the police, I do
remember stabbing him once, because I remember saying that's it, I can't take more, I've
had enough and I stabbed him.80
A case such as this, which involves the wresting of a knife away from the
attacker and then using it to defend oneself against further attack
(Flood's husband had also tried to strangle her that night), could easily
accommodate the requirement that the attack be imminent. More
difficult are cases where there is a threat of later violence (as there
would be in a case similar to Thornton's situation) or where the claimed
self-defence occurs some time after the attack (as in a case like that of
Ahluwalia: after her husband had burned her with an iron, she waited
until he was asleep and set his feet on fire; the fire spread and he later
died). It is then more difficult to prove to the court's satisfaction that
self-defence and not primary aggression was occurring. Under the
present interpretive standards employed by the courts, these two latter
types of situation would not be considered to fall within the category of
self-defence.l1 Again, it can be argued that judicial attention to the
specificity of the battered woman's position could overcome these
difficulties and open up the defence for use in such situations. I will
return to this point in my later discussion of the Canadian interpretation
of self-defence when a battered woman kills her abuser.
80 "Heart of the Matter", supra note 69.
81 O'Donovan summarizes the historical evolution of judicial reluctance to include these cases
as self-defence in "Defences", supra note 30 at 221-23.
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I have used the cases of women such as Thornton and
Ahluwahlia in illustrating my argument, although they did not plead
self-defence, no doubt on the justified advice of their counsel that it
would be unlikely to succeed. However, I would argue that their
situations, and those of many other battered women, should be able to
be interpreted as falling under the heading of self-defence. Many of the
reforms that have occurred in other jurisdictions, notably the United
States and Canada, have involved accepting that the battered woman
who kills should be acquitted due to self-defence. I will now turn to the
defence of diminished responsibility.
C. Diminished Responsibility
The Homicide Act 195782 introduced a new defence to murder,
known as diminished responsibility. If successfully pleaded, the accused
is entitled to a conviction for manslaughter rather than a complete
acquittal (as would be the case with an insanity plea where the accused
would be found not guilty by reason of insanity). Section 2 of the
Homicide Act provides that a person shall not be convicted of murder if
he or she was suffering from an abnormality of mind that substantially
impaired mental responsibility for the homicidal act. The abnormality of
mind may arise from arrested or retarded development, inherent causes,
or any induced disease or injury. "Abnormality of mind" has been
interpreted to mean something different from "defect of reason" in the
M'Naghten Rules on insanity. It means rather "a state of mind so
different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man
would term it abnormal."8 3
Provocation and self-defence, therefore, require the defendant
to establish that she shares the characteristics of the reasonable man;
diminished responsibility demands that she prove herself to be so far in
state of mind from that of the reasonable man that it should be
considered abnormal. As Allen points out, a kind of inverted
"reasonable man" test is invoked here, where the defendant is to be
excused because no reasonable man could have acted that wayl 4 The
distinction between the employment of "reasonable" contained within
provocation and self-defence on one hand, and that within diminished
8 2 Supra note 26.
83 R v. Byrne, [1960] 2 Q.B. 396 at 403, Lord Parker Ci.
8 4 Alen, Justice Unbalanced, supra note 63 at 26.
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responsibility on the other, is of great importance when examining the
defences available to battered women who kill, since diminished
responsibility could be said to be the defence which is the most easily
accessible. The case of Robinson85 involved a woman who had been
attacked several times by her violent husband, ending up in hospital for
emergency treatment. Eventually, she attacked him with a hammer and
strangled him. Her plea of diminished responsibility was successful; she
was put on probation for two years.
This case and others like it demonstrate the success that a
battered woman who kills may have when pleading diminished
responsibility.86 It may seem a tempting option as a defence, if the facts
can be thus presented. However, there are considerable problems
inherent in the use of this defence. First, the woman must claim to
suffer from an abnormality of the mind. The attention of the court will
be on her abnormal state of mind at the time of the homicide; her act
must be shown to be the result of a mental state so far from the ordinary
person's that a reasonable man would call her responsibility thus
diminished. Since, as I have shown above, many judicial
pronouncements reveal a presumption that a battered woman need not
resort to lethal force, it is easy to see why judges are content with the
notion that such a homicide was, by definition, unreasonable and, in fact,
the product of a mental abnormality.
The second problem relates to a shift of focus away from the
actions of the batterer. The focus of the trial will be on the abnormality
of the woman's mind, not on the appalling violence she has suffered. In
merely excusing her homicide, the law exculpates the violent man.
Related to this is a third difficulty in pleading diminished responsibility:
the fact that the woman cannot claim her act was justified and
reasonable, as she could if self-defence were accepted; or that her act
was reasonable, as she could if provocation were allowed. While all
three defences may lead to a non-custodial outcome, the symbolic value
of declaring justification and reasonableness is highly important. A
fourth issue relates to the fact that a plea of diminished responsibility
still results in a conviction, unlike a plea of self-defence. Finally, if
evidence as to battered woman syndrome is accepted in future by the
court, it is likely that it would result in more pleas of diminished
responsibility, since it aims to establish that the woman suffered a
85nm LawRepo, (7 July 1990).
86 In his article, "Punishment and Self-Defense" (1989) 8 Law & Phil. 201, G. Fletcher
emphasizes that self-defence will not be available when it appears to judicial interpretation that the
defendant has attempted to dispense "private vengeance" or "individual justice."
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particular mental disorder as a result of persistent battering.87 For all
these reasons, it is my contention that diminished responsibility as a
defence for battered women who kill is highly unsatisfactory and should
be avoided where possible.
Even where psychiatrists agree that a mental disorder exists, the
court may not accept that it has any relevance to the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the homicide. In Thornton, it appeared that the
court was unable to accept that Thornton was the victim of this situation,
rather than the deceased: to the court, her actions seemed to be more
consistent with aggression and private vengeance than with
victimization.88 Diminished responsibility, then, although apparently a
promising choice of defence, should be avoided as risky, exculpatory for
the man, excusing rather than justifying the woman's actions, and
establishing her abnormality rather than her reasonableness. The next
section will examine, in contrast to the above, the position in Canada
relating to the legal position of battered women in general, and the
specific position of battered women who kill.
IV. THE BATTERED WOMAN IN CANADIAN LAW
The battered woman's movement began its struggles in Canada
in the 1970s.8 9 McGillivray details how, by the early 1980s, the
movement had won governmental support.90 The process of gaining
such support, however, was neither easy nor straightforward. As
MacLeod writes:
Just a few years ago, wife battering was still a laughing matter for some of Canada's
political leaders. On May 12,1982, when the problem of wife battering was raised in the
87 See below.
88 M. Kelman, "Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness" (1991) 17 Critical Inquiry 798.
Kelman compares the self-defence of a battered woman who kills her abuser and the vigilante who
kills a would-be attacker (with specific resonance to the case of Bernard Goetz). G.P. Fletcher also
writes on Goetz in A Cdrne of Self-Defense (New York: Free Press, 1988).
89 N.Z. Hilton, "One in Ten: The Struggle and Disempowerment of the Battered Women's
Movement" (1988) 7 Can. J. Faro. L 313; GA. Walker, Family Vwlence and the Women's
Movement: The Conceptual Politics of Struggle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990)
[hereinafter Fami/y Vw/ence]; and L MacLeod, Battered but not Beaten ... Preventing Wife Batteiing
in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1987) [hereinafter
Battered but not Beaten].
90 A. McGillivray, "Battered Women: Definition, Models and Prosecutorial Policy" (1987) 6
Can. J. Fan. L 15.
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House of Commons as a serious and widespread reality suffered by one out of ten
Canadian women, laughter echoed through the House.91
The incident was reported in Hansard as follows:
Mrs. Margaret Mitchell: ... It states that one in ten husbands beat their wives regularly.
Some Hon. members: Oh, ohl
Mrs. Mitchell: These women -
Some Hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mrs. Mitchell: I do not think it is very much of a laughing matter, Madam Speaker.
An Hon. member. I don't beat my wife.92
The public outcry that followed the reporting of this incident was such
that it appeared to require governmental action to demonstrate how
seriously wife battering was taken in Canada.93
In the 1970s, the women's movement had established shelters for
battered women, as a response to the documentation of wife beating as a
social problem. 94 Hilton chides the tendency to treat this as a
"discovery," thus effacing the history of women's attempts to end
battering over the centuries.95 To this extent, there are considerable
parallels with activism going on around the same time in Britain and the
United StatesY6 Hilton97 and Beaudry9 8 have described how the success
of the Quebec movement, in alerting the provincial government to the
91 MacLeod, Battered but not Beaten, supia note 89 at 3.
92 In the Parliamentary Debates, 32nd Parliament, First Session at 17334; also cited by Hilton,
supra note 89 at 329, note 89.
93 MacLeod, Battered but not Beaten, supra note 89 at 3.
94 See, for example, J. Barnsley, Battered and Blamed- A Report on Wife Assault from the
Perspective of Battered Women (Vancouver: Vancouver Women's Research Centre and Vancouver
Transition House, 1980); and J. Downey & J. Howell, Wife Battering: A Review and Preliminary
Enquiry into Local Inddence, Needs and Resources (Vancouver: United Way of Vancouver, 1976).
95 Hilton, supra note 89 at 322-23. For an analysis of some of these attempts, see C. Bauer &
L Ritt, "A Husband is a Beating Animal': Frances Power Cobb Confronts the Wife Abuse Problem
in Victorian England" (1983) 6 Int'l J. of Women's Stud. 99; C. Bauer & L Ritt, "Wife Abuse, Late
Victorian English Feminists and the Legacy of Frances Power Cobb" (1983) 6 Int'l J. of Women's
Stud. 195; and Pleck, "Feminist Responses", supra note 9.
96 See especially E. Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the Neighbours will Hear (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1974); and KJ. Tierney, "The Battered Woman Movement and the Creation of the Wife
Beating Problem" (1982) 29 Social Problems 201. In the United States, NOW, the National
Organization of Women which was founded by Betty Friedan, initiated a Task Force on Battered
Wives in 1974. In London, the First Women's Aid Centre was founded at Chiswick. In Quebec, the
first referral centres opened in the early 1970s: see M. Beaudxy, Battered Women, trans. L Huston &
M. Heap (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1985).
97 Supra note 89.
98 Supra note 96.
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problem of wife battering, may be perceived as leading to a co-opting of
the movement's aims and a depoliticization of the radical claims about
the roots of wife battering in patriarchal society.99 Hilton writes:
"members of the Quebec movement realized too late that their
collaboration with the government had led to their loss of ownership of
the battered women issue." 10o
Whatever losses were sustained in the process, the battered
women's movement did succeed in establishing the need for
governmental support of responses to wife battering.101 After the
laughter in the House of Commons had died down, and the resulting
public outcry gathered momentum, it became apparent that the
governmental response was to be a matter of statistics:102 as MacLeod
writes, "A concern with incidence became central to our understanding
of the problem with which we were dealing. Knowing how many women
and what types of women were battered seemed crucial in identifying
adequate and appropriate responses to the problem."103 The resulting
crisis mentality produced a sense of urgency. Many procedures were
instituted to support battered women, to aid prosecution of batterers,
and to ameliorate a life-or-death problemj4 For example, the Report
of the Standing Committee on Health, Welfare, and Social Affairs
recommended two main lines of response: the establishment of shelters
99 See also P. Morgan, "From Battered Wife to Program Client The State's Shaping of Social
Problems" (1981) 9 Kapitalistate 17.
1 00 Supra note 89 at 325.
1 01 L MacLeod, Wife Battering in Canada: The Vicious Circle (Quebec: Supply & Services
Canada, 1980) at 21, states the statistic of one in ten. In 1981, the Hon. J. Robert Howie asked the
House of Commons to have the Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs
investigate the prevalence, identification and treatment of family violence, especially wife battering.
This motion was passed without question. See also, Legislature of Ontario Standing Committee on
Social Development: First Report on Family Violence: Wife Battering (Toronto: Queen's Park,
1982).
102 S.E. Small, Wife Assaut.An Overview of the Problem in Canada (Toronto: Support Services
for Assaulted Women, 1980) represents one of the first attempts at documenting the extent of the
problem.
103 MacLeod, Battered but not Beaten, supra note 89 at 3. MacLeod has written several reports
for the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (cAcsw); see also Wife Battering is
Everywomen's Issue A Summary Report of the cAcsw Consultation on Wife Battering (Ottawa: CAcsw,
1980); and Preventing Wife Battering: Towards a New Understanding (Ottawa: CACSW, 1989).
104 See G. Larouche & L Gagn6, "Oit en est la situation de la violence envers les femmes
dam le milieu familial, dix am aprbs les colloques sur la violence?" (1990) 8 Criminologie 23.
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and the reform of police charging practices. 05 On 8 July 1982,
Parliament unanimously passed a motion to encourage police
prosecution in all cases of wife beating.0 6 The Final Report of the
Federal, Provincial and Territorial Group on Wife Battering stated,
"The charges should serve two goals: to convey to abusive men that it is
just as unacceptable to assault their own wives as it is to assault anybody
else; and secondly, to convey to assaulted women that help is available
through the legal system." 10 7
Although admirable in the speed of its reformist response and
commendable in comparison with the lethargic responses of successive
governments to the demands of the battered women's movement in
Britain, problems can still be identified in the Canadian attempt to
create a legal framework which might effectively answer the needs of
battered women.' 8 First, although much was said about the need to
develop a wide-ranging network of shelters and although they had been
in the forefront of highlighting the problem,'109 shelters and transition
houses were and remain desperately under-resourced. Despite an
increase in the number of shelters,110 there are still too few places for
women who are attempting to leave their violent partners. One house in
Toronto reported in 1986 that they turned away ten women for every
one they were able to house.111
The second defect in the new responses related to the
inadequacy of the criminal justice system to provide reinforcement to
any increased police prosecutorial policies. Any messages of deterrence
to men and of support to women embodied in police charging practices
were undermined by the reluctance of the courts to convict and their
105 House of Commons Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs, Inquby
into violence in the family (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1982). Hilton documents the practices of the
London City Police Force in Ontario, unusual in its commitment to prosecution several years ahead
of other forces, supra note 89 at 328-29.
1 06 Canada, Parliamentary Debate, House of Commons Debates (8 July 1982) at 19119-20.
107 Status of Women Canada, Implementation Report of the 1984 Federal/Provinclal/Tenitodal
Report on Wife Battering, Federal Section (Ottawa: 1986) at 28.
108 j. Barnsley, FeministAction, Institutional Reaction: Responses to WifeAssaudt (Vancouver:
Women's Research Centre, 1985).
109 J. Ridington, "The Transition Process: A Feminist Environment as Reconstitutive Milieu"
(1977-78) 2 Victimology 563.
110 For example, the number of shelters increased from 85 in 1982 to 264 in 1987, MacLeod,
Battered but not Beaten, supra note 89 at 3.
111 Ibid at 7. See also T. Don, An Introduction to the Ontario Association of Interval and
Transition Houses (Toronto: oAmi, 1985).
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predisposition in favour of passing nominal sentences.1 12 Not only,
therefore, were there still complaints that police enforcement was
haphazard and unenthusiastic, 113 but the lax enforcement of the law by
the courts, in cases that did result in prosecution, could convey the
impression that woman battering is acceptable and criminal sanctions
inappropriate.11 4 Attempts by women to pursue private legal action
were frequently unsuccessful (the court appears to treat such cases even
less seriously than if the police had been involved) and often resulted in
greater danger for the woman.115
Finally, the new system of responses to woman battering failed
battered women themselves: Hilton describes this as the
"disempowerment of battered women" 116 and MacLeod writes of its
failing "the test of battered women's realities."117 By this, she is
referring to the inability of the system to predict and take account of the
needs and demands of battered women: for example, in resisting the
assumption that the relationship with the batterer should end (asking
instead that he be given the means by which to reform, through
psychosocial counselling, education, therapy, etc.); and in resisting the
112 My interest here is not in arguing whether such a policy of criminalization is the correct or
only response to battering. Instead, firstly, I am following the arguments made about empowerment
through prosecution as a desire of many battered women, as found in Jaffe et aL, "The Impact of
Police Charges in Incidents of Wife Abuse" (1986) 1 . Fain. Violence 37; P. Jaffe & CA. Burnis,
"Wife Abuse as a Crime: The Impact of Police Laying Charges" (1983) 25 Can. . Crim. 309; and
D.A. Ford, "Prosecution as a Victim Power Response: A Note on Empowering Women in Violent
Conjugal Relationships" (1991) 25 L & S. Rev. 313. Secondly, it is necessary to examine whether
such a policy was indeed instituted, deployed, and sustained, given that this was the stated intention
of the Canadian legislatures. On treatment-oriented responses to battering, see, for example, D.
Adams & AJ. McCormick, "Men Unlearning Violence: A Group Approach Based on the
Collective Model" in M. Roy, ed., TheAbusive Paner:. An Analysis of Domestic Battering (Toronto:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1982) 170; and DJ. Sonkin, etal, The Mate Batterer.A TatnmentApproach
(New York: Springer, 1985).
113 See A. Bissett-Johnson, "Domestic Violence: A Plethora of Problems and Precious Few
Solutions" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L 253; and J. Meade-Ramrattan, et al., "Physically-abused
Women: Satisfaction with Sources of Help" (1980) 48 Social Worker 162. Note how the weight of
history can constitute an inertia against change; see Berk et aL, supra note 70 on the reluctance of
police to alter their practices. The police tend to cite fear of injury as one of the major reasons for
non-intervention. However, studies show that this fear is over-estimated in cases of conjugal
violence: D. Ellis, "Policing Wife Abuse: The Contributions Made by 'Domestic Disturbances' to
Deaths and Injuries among Police Officers" (1987) J. Fan. Violence 319.
114 Hiltonsupra note 89 at 331.
115 M. Baril et aL, "Quand les femmes sent victimes ... quand les hoinmes appliquent la loi"
(1983) 16 Criminologie 89.
116 Hilton, supra note 89 at 332.
117 MacLeod, Battered but not Beaten, supra note 89 at 4.
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notion that they were distinct from "ordinary" women and thus a social
problem that could be counted and measured.118 Hilton's point is that
"governmental and professional involvement has repossessed the
battered women problem and quelled the penetrating examination of
our society for which the battered women's movement had fought." 19
It is clear that the general legal context relating to battered
women in Canada is simultaneously different and similar to the legal
system in Britain. On one hand, it is clear that the Canadian
jurisdictions appear to have paid much more attention to the issue and
have at least attempted to institute some procedures that might be
effective, in comparison to Britain's reluctance, at the official level, to
create any substantial reforms in the last fifteen years. On the other
hand, the consensus appears to be that the Canadian procedures fail in
ways very similar to how the British system fails: a lack of consistent
application, a judiciary which has been reluctant to convict men of
crimes of violence against their partners, and a continuing under-funding
of women's shelters and organizations. It is within this context of similar
differences that I will now proceed to examine the specific responses of
the Canadian legal system to battered women who kill their abusers.
V. BATIERED WOMEN WHO KILL THEIR ABUSERS:
LA VALL&E
Studies of the incidence of battering in Canada have produced a
vast amount of statistics. According to the General Social Survey (oss)
conducted by Statistics Canada in 1988, an estimated 7 women per 1,000
were assaulted one or more times during 1987 by a spouse or former
spouse. Fifty per cent of these were assaulted more than once.
According to the Canadian Urban Victimization Survey (cuvs) in 1982
and the Gss, women account for 80 to 90 per cent of victims of inter-
spousal violence. Seventy-five per cent of the incidents in both surveys
118 For examples of the many studies aimed at creating taxonomies of battered women, see
D.G. Dutton, "An Ecologically Nested Theory of Male Violence toward Intimates" (1985) 8 Int'l J.
of Women's Stud. 404; J.B. Fleming, Stopping Wife Abuse: A Guide to the Emotiona Psychoogical
and Legal Implications for the Abused Woman and Those Helping Her (Garden City, New York:
Anchor/Doubleday, 1979); JJ. Gayford, "Battered Wives" (1975) 15 Med. Sc. & L 237; L Gillman,
"An Object-Relations Approach to the Phenomenon and Treatment of Battered Wives" (1980) 42
Psychiatry 346; E. Hilberman & K. Munson, "Sixty Battered Women" (1977-78) 3.4 Victimology
460; M.D. Pagelow, Woman-Battering: Vctims and their Expedeces (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981); and
B. Star, "Comparing Battered and Non-Battered Women" (1978) 3 Victimology 32.
11 9 Hilton, supra note 89 at 332-33.
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involved physical or sexual attack. Twenty per cent of attacks involved
the use of a weapon, usually bottles or blunt objects. Less than half (44
per cent) of the incidents in the cuvs were reported to the police. In
1989, 76 women died at the hands of their spouses 20 C6t6 writes that,
in Quebec, between 1974 and 1989, 37 women killed their partners.
That figure represents 14 per cent of the total number of conjugal
homicides. On average, this means that three or four women each year
in Quebec will kill their partners. 12'
As an antidote to the aridity of the preceding statistics,
Dworkin's comments may be useful:
We are very close to death. All women are. And we are very close to rape and we are
very close to beating ... We use statistics not to try to quantify the injuries, but to convince
the world that those injuries even exist. Those statistics are not abstractions ... Those
statistics are not abstract to me. Every three minutes a woman is being raped. Every
eighteen seconds a woman is being beaten. There is nothing abstract about it.122
The "true incidence" does not really matter. The main point is that
women experience battering and, as I have tried to show above, while
there may be slightly better options and greater awareness of the issue in
Canada than in Britain, the fact remains that a considerable number of
women are killed by their partners. A smaller group of women, in
response to violence against them, resort to deadly force.
One of these women is Angelique Lyn Lavall6e. She had lived
with her partner, Kevin Rust, for about four years. It was a violent
relationship. She had been seriously injured by him several times. On
one occasion, attending hospital for medical help, she told the doctors
that she had fallen off a horse.123 One night in 1989, Lavall6e and Rust
had a party. Towards 1 A.M., he began to beat her; she took refuge in a
closet in their bedroom. Rust found her and shouted at her that she
belonged to him and must do as he told her. He struck her on the face
and head. Placing a gun in her hand, he told her that, when all their
guests had left, either he would kill her or she would have to kill him. As
he turned his back to leave the room, Lavall6e shot him dead with one
12 0 The source of these statistics is the material produced by Statistics Canada on WifeAssault,
included in the documentation for the National Symposium of Women, Law and the Administration
of Justice in Vancouver, 10-12 June 1991. I am indebted to Margaret Shaw for making these and
other materials available to me.
121 C8t6, supra note 7 at 115.
12 2 A. Dworkin, "I Want a Twenty-four Hour Truce during which There is no Rape" in Leuer
from a War Zone: Writings, 1976-1987 (New York: Secker& Warburg, 1988) at 163.
123 S. Bindman, "Top court upholds acquittal, 'Battered wife syndrome' defence in man's
slaying" The Vancouver Sun (3 May 1990) 1.
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bullet in the back of the head. 24 She was charged with murder in the
second degree (which carries a sentence of ten years before parole can
be allowed). At her trial, she pleaded self-defence and was acquitted.
The Crown appealed and a new trial was ordered by the Court of
Appeal. The case was then heard by the Supreme Court of Canada,
which reinstated the acquittal.
The case has since been hailed as a feminist victory, since the
judgment, written by Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, states that the law
must accommodate the perspectives of women in general and those of
the battered woman in particular. Boyle writes:
Thus the Court has indicated that the factor of gender is germane to what is reasonable ...
The case is important methodologically as the situation examined was not simply the
killing itself. Rather, the Court was signaling a willingness to examine social context in
which gender is significant-the research on battered women, the history of sex
discrimination, and the fact that the imminent attack doctrine might in effect be a
sentence of death.12 5
Boisvert sees the decision as indicating the increasing recognition, by the
courts and by the law, of the needs and demands of women.1 26 C6t6
writes: "not only does [this judgment] propose a redefinition of 'reason'
and 'objectivity' in terms of women's perspectives, it also constitutes a
break with a tradition which has for too long sanctioned violence against
women. 127
Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, who gave the judgment in
Lavall~e, described the significance of the case as follows:
The law of self-defence was critically examined to expose its elements as reflecting and
embodying male experience with violence and hence male evaluations of appropriate
responses to violence. Expert evidence of the experience of battered women put a new
complexion on self-defence from the perspective of a battered woman. Angelique
Lavallee was acquitted when the social reality of wife battering and its documented
effects on women victims was not only taken into account but was incorporated into the
legal concept of self-defence.128
124 These are the facts as recounted in Ct6, supra note 7 at 132-33. See also the case report
R v. Lava!/fe [1990], 1 S.C.R. 852 [hereinafterLaval/e].
125 C. Boyle, "Gender and the Substantive Law" (Address to the National Symposium on
Women, Law and the Administration of Justice, 10-12 June 1991) [unpublished] at 4.
126 Boisvert, supra note 53 at 194.
12 7 My translation of C6t6, supra note 7 at 135.
128 Hon. B. Wilson, "Women, the Family and the Constitutional Protection of Privacy" (Third
Muriel V. Roscoe Lecture presented at the McGill Centre for Research and Teaching on Women,
McGill University, 14 November 1991) [unpublished], also presented at the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Conference in June 1991, published in (1992) 17 Queen's L. 15 at 20.
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The judgment of the Supreme Court elaborates how this was
accomplished. Self-defence in Canadian law, codified in section 34 of
the Criminal Code,129 allows a person to be justified in defending himself
or herself and in repelling an illegitimate attack. The force used must be
that which is sufficient to avert the danger. Retreat, or other licit means
of averting attack, must be impossible.130 According to paragraph 34(2),
and as pleaded by Lavall6e at trial, a defendant may intentionally cause
the death of an attacker who is mounting an unprovoked assault on the
defendant, if certain conditions are met. First, the defendant must
reasonably believe that she is likely to sustain death or serious injury if
she does not act in self-defence. Second, she must reasonably believe
that there exists no other way of averting the danger.
In relation to the first requirement, the jury must examine the
reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the imminence and severity
of the danger; this belief has to be measured according to the standard
of the "reasonable man." The jury must be satisfied that a reasonable
man in the defendant's position would have believed in the likelihood of
death or serious injury. As Boisvert points out, recourse to the
reasonable man allows self-defence its justificatory nature: "intentional
homicide committed in self-defence is not a crime because such an act
conforms to the norm."131
A. Reason and Femininity
The adherence to the standard of the reasonable man has been
much criticized throughout North American jurisdictions. Schneider
writes:
Female traits have been viewed as the antithesis of reasonableness; women were
considered incapable of meeting the standard required of a reasonable man. Rationality
has been considered a male characteristic, women have been viewed as 'disabled' by their
lack of logic. This sex stereotype and the atypical self-defense settings in which women
act have made it difficult for them to appear reasonable and demonstrate the
reasonableness of their acts.132
129  S.C., 1985, c. C-46.
130 W. Lafave & A. Scott, A Handbook on Criminal Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing,
1972) at 391.
131 My translation of Boisvert, supra note 53 at 198.
132 E.M. Schneider, "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense"
(1980) 15 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Liberties L Rev. 623 at 636.
1993]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Boisvert asserts that, rather than there being no notion of a "reasonable
woman," the problem is that the collective vision of the reasonable
woman does not correspond to the notion of reasonableness which lies
at the heart of legal norms.133 Crocker claims that "as a fictional,
hypothetical individual, the reasonable man does not reflect the social
reality of anyone." 134 Fiora-Gormally charges clinicians and therapists
with the preservation of preconceptions about rationality and gender,
arguing that it is their assumptions of what makes a "healthy adult" into
a Catch-22 for women: to be a healthy adult they must lose their
femininity (and, therefore, become an unhealthy woman), while to be a
normal "feminine woman" she must display traits which do not conform
to notions of a healthy adult.135
Criticism, therefore, takes one or more of various forms: an
alleged failure to take account of the lived realities and experiences of
individuals in general or of battered women in particular (a
phenomenological criticism); a saturation with sex bias which favours
male defendants over women (a liberal sociological criticism); and an
inaccurate or misjudged understanding of what it means to be an
individual thanks to a reliance on psychologistic notions of reason (an
anti-psychology criticism).
In Lavall~e, Madam Justice Wilson stated clearly the argument
that the judicial notion of the reasonable man or reasonable person
ignores the lived realities of women. The definition of what is
reasonable must be adapted to the circumstances occupied by the
battered woman, which are entirely foreign to the hypothetical
"reasonable man." 136 It is apparent that the Court is founding its
criticisms of the notion of the reasonable man upon phenomenological
and sociological grounds. As will become clear later, the Court certainly
does not take an anti-psychiatry stand.
To enable the jury to understand the perspective of the battered
woman, the Supreme Court endorsed the provision of expert testimony
in the form of psychiatric evidence about whether the accused suffers
from "battered woman syndrome" (Bws). One of the elements of the
Crown's appeal against Lavall6e's acquittal related to this testimony.
133 Boisvert, supra note 53 at 199.
134 P.L. Crocker, "The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women who Kill Men in Self-
Defense" (1985) 8 Harv. Women's L. Rev. 121 at 125.
135 N. Fiora-Gormally, "Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single
Standard In?" (1978) 2 L & Human Behavior 133.
13 6 Lavall&, supra note 124 at 874.
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Lavall6e did not give evidence at trial; instead, a psychiatrist, Dr. Fred
Shane, testified at length about her experience of BwS. The Court felt
that it was important that the jury should hear this evidence in order to
keep at bay the stereotypes that might otherwise affect their verdict. In
terms of the requirement within the Criminal Code that the defendant
must show apprehension of death or serious injury to be reasonable, the
Court stated that psychiatric evidence about Bws could demonstrate how
Lavall6e's relationship with Rust had deteriorated to the extent that she
suffered terror in his presence13 7
A crucial aspect of the determination of the reasonableness of
the accused's apprehensions of death or serious injury relates to the
perceived imminence of the attack (although section 34(2) contains no
express requirement of imminence, it has been so interpreted within the
case-law)83 It has been pointed out that the requirement of imminence
relates most closely to a sudden fight between two men of equivalent
strength;139 this was recognized by the Court in Lavallie: Madam
Justice Wilson stated that "imminent" implies a knife raised to stab or a
gun loaded and aimed at another person. 40 Given that most battered
women who resort to deadly force do so after a period of time has
elapsed and their partner has turned his back or is asleep, it is easy to see
how it could be difficult to plead self-defence. In the case of Whynot
(Stafford),141 Jane Stafford shot her appallingly violent husband while he
was unconscious after drinking a large amount of alcohol. He had
threatened to kill her son and to burn a neighbour out of her home.
Stafford was originally acquitted on the grounds that she had acted in
self-defence; however, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal ordered a new
trial (again for murder in the first degree, which carries a mandatory
twenty-five year sentence). She pleaded guilty to manslaughter rather
than face a second trial and was sentenced to six months in prison (she
was released after two). The relatively short sentence should not distract
from the fact that her original acquittal on the basis of self-defence was
overturned. Had she been tried a second time, with the judge forbidden
137 Ibid.
138 See Reilly v. R., [1984] 2 1RC.S. 396; and R. v. Baxter (1975), 33 C.R.N.S. (Ont CA.).
13 9 Boisvert, supra note 53 at 203.
140 LavalUe, supra note 124 at 876.
141 Supra note 37.
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to allow a plea of self-defence, she would probably have been convicted
of murder 42
The Court of Appeal in Whynot (Stafford) stated that
self-defence could not be pleaded when the attack was anticipated,
rather than imminent or in progress. In Lavallte, however, Madam
Justice Wilson notes that while the "reasonable man" would not see any
real danger of death in the conduct of Kevin Rust, the battered woman
certainly would. Again, it was felt that expert evidence about the effects
of Bws could help the jury to understand why a battered woman would
see a lethal threat in such a situation. The effect of this development is
to allow battered women to plead self-defence in situations where the
requirement of imminence could not ordinarily be met. Perhaps
anticipating criticisms that such a move gives women a licence to carry
out acts of private vengeance, Madam Justice Wilson likens the battered
woman's position to that of a hostage who has been told that he will be
killed in three days. Madam Justice Wilson stated, "The situation of the
battered woman as described by Dr. Shane strikes me as somewhat
analogous to that of a hostage. If the captor tells her that he will kill her
in three days time, is it potentially reasonable for her to seize an
opportunity presented on the first day to kill the captor or must she wait
until he makes the attempt on the third day?" 143 This clever analogy
could be adapted usefully into the law of self-defence in England.
B. A Reasonable Belief that No Alternatives Exist
Section 34(2) of the Criminal Code states that killing the
aggressor must reasonably seem to be the only possible action. At this
point, the prosecution might raise the popular questions asked of a
battered woman: why did she stay in the relationship, why did she not
ask for help, why did she not get a divorce? Madam Justice Wilson
stated in Lavallie that these questions are not pertinent: the fact at issue
is whether the battered woman could have reasonably believed that the
use of lethal force was the only possible course of action open to her.1 a
Once more, psychiatric evidence is seen as the means of aiding the jury
to understand the woman's position, offering answers to the questions of
why she had not left the man when violence began and why she did not
142 Jane Hurshman's (Stafford) killing of Billy Stafford was felt by many to be justified,
including the local police who said that she deserved a medal; in Vallee, supra note 37.
143 Lavalle, supra note 124 at 889.
144 /bki at 884.
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attempt to escape when she believed her life was in danger.145 Madam
Justice Wilson took pains to emphasize that these issues should be
explained to the jury through expert evidence, but they were not
germane to the reasonableness of her perception of the necessity of
lethal force. She stated:
it is not for the jury to judge the fact that a battered woman has remained with the man
who has beaten her ... A man's house may be his castle, but it is also a woman's home,
even if it can seem to her more like a prison ... 146
This stands in considerable contrast to judicial pronouncements in
English law, where it often appears that the woman's right to live
unmolested in her home is secondary to the right of the man to do as he
pleases there.147
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF L4VALLAE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
When making a straightforward comparison between, for
example, Thornton, and the Canadian law as exemplified in Lavalle, it is
tempting to see the latter as manifestly more progressive than the
English law. For feminist legal scholars in England it would be a happy
day indeed to have the House of Lords or Court of Appeal endorse the
need to avoid masculinist stereotyping and to take account of women's
perspectives. Within that frame, Lavallte seems to be a "better"
decision. My interests at this point, however, are in the insights that
English legal scholars, concerned to argue for reform of English criminal
defences, might gain from an analysis of the Canadian approach. This is
not to subtract from the value of Lavale as a precedent which has
enormous pragmatic value in legal defence work.1 48 Rather it is to
question the certainty with which Lavalle has been hailed as a departure
from the "traditional" decisions and values which shape a case such as
Thornton.
145 bid. at 888.
146 bid at 888-89.
1 4 7 See Richards v. Richards, [1983] 2 All E.R. 807; Matrimonial Homes Act 1983, (U.K.), 1983,
c. 19; and McCann, supra note 15.
1 48 G.G. Brodsky, "Battered Spouse Syndrome: A Defence Counsel's Perspective" (1987) 5
Crown Coun. Rev. 1.
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A. Subsequent Case-law
It has been claimed that Lavallie has had a positive impact on
later cases. Comack cites two examples. In February 1991, a court in
British Columbia dropped charges of murder in the second degree
against a woman who had shot her violent husband. The legal
recognition of Bws in Lavalle was cited as the basis for the Court's
decision. In August 1991, a woman received a three-year suspended
sentence and three years' probation after shooting to death her
abuser.1 49 The latter case would be considered a success according to
Walker's criterion (the low percentage of cases in which she has been
involved as an expert witness resulting in the defendant having to serve a
prison sentence).150
Whereas the former case does appear to register a beneficial
result for the defendant, the latter rather seems to follow a different
course. The woman concerned has been convicted of a serious crime
(manslaughter) and, although she does not have to spend any time in
prison, she has gained a criminal record. C6t6 voices similar doubts in
connection with a Montreal case,151 suggesting that-while the judge no
doubt evinced compassion for the defendant in dispensing a
non-custodial sentence-a more positive result would have been her
acquittal. This is the case of Micheline Poulos. For fifteen years Poulos
had been the lover of Frank Guzzo, a minor member of the Montreal
Mafia. He cohabited with another woman (Olga Naperecka), but
Poulos spent most nights on the floor beside their bed. Guzzo
controlled her bank account, beat her, and terrorized her. When he
became ill, the two women were ordered to spend their days looking
after him, in a state of silence which he had commanded (Poulos having
been ordered to give up her job). Guzzo believed that he had cancer,
although the autopsy revealed malnutrition and gangrene; he would
have survived for several years. However, he told Poulos to buy a gun
(which she did) and to kill him, Naperecka, and then herself. Poulos
shot him six times in the head and waited thirty minutes before calling
149 Comack, "Legal Recognition", supra note 1 at 19. See K. MacQueen, "Court ruling
recognized fear ended violent, abusive marriage, 'I can only say that, Mrs. Murray, you have
suffered greatly'- The Vancouver Sun (1 March 1991) Al; and N. Balsara, "Killed abusive husband,
Manitoba woman freed, Judge rules justice would not be served by jail sentence" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (12 August 1991) A5.
150 Walker, TerifyingLove supra note 51.
151 See Ct6, supra note 7 at 137.
[VOL 31 No. 4
Conjugal Homicide
for assistance (as he had ordered). She made no attempt to kill
Naperecka or herself.
Poulos was charged with second-degree murder. The defence
adduced expert evidence from a psychiatrist who asserted that Poulos
suffered from "dependent personality disorder," which he likened to
Bws. Her act, it was said, was not voluntary, since her will had been
colonized by Guzzo. The jury found her guilty of manslaughter and she
was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The judge appeared
sympathetic to Poulos, who was portrayed throughout the trial and in the
press as inadequate and pathetic, but stated firmly that any sentence less
than the one given would be to "slide into the abyss."152
While generalizations cannot safely be made on the basis of a
few cases, it is still possible to contrast the strong terms of Madam
Justice Wilson's statements in Lavallte with the much less dramatic
results in some of the cases that have followed. It would, therefore,
appear that LavalMe cannot be assumed to herald a new era of judicial
enlightenment. Rather, it is more likely that Canadian courts will
proceed cautiously, producing many compromise judgments and
sentences. This may keep the media and Crown prosecutors contented;
it does less for battered women than Lavall6e claimed was their due.
B. Reliance on Pathologization of Women's Behaviour
As noted above, while criticizing legal doctrine for its sex bias
and its ignorance of women's experiences, the Supreme Court in
Lavallde did not take a stance against the doctrinal and judicial tendency
to interpret women's behaviour and attitudes through a psychiatric
prism. The ability of expert evidence, almost always psychiatric, to
portray the realities of battered women's lives for the jury is a constant
trope in the judgment of the court. The testimony of the psychiatrist can
explain why the woman does not leave, why she may claim to love the
man she killed, and why she believes she had no options other than
homicide. All this can be explained through the notion of battered
woman syndrome. There is a special appeal in such testimony. The
acceptance of expert testimony on BWS means that, as in Lavall~e's case,
an accredited expert can translate the perspectives of the battered
woman into psychiatric terminology. The woman's experiences are
1 5 2 y. Boisvert, "Micheline Poulos condamn6e A trois ans de prison" La Pesse (19 May 1990)
A3; R. Laurent, "Woman gets 3-year prison term for 'mercy killing'" The Montreal Gazette (19 May
1990) A3.
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deemed to be relevant only to the extent to which they conform to the
contours of BWS. Furither, the woman who uses evidence about Bws in
establishing her defence, whether it is provocation, insanity, self-defence
or diminished capacity,153 is making a statement about her state of mind
and her identity.
Bws is understood as a disorder or abnormality,154 which will
clear up or improve after a period of time away from the abuse or with
the appropriate psychiatric help. All the battered woman's actions are
classified as abnormal, whether they relate to remaining in the
relationship;155 refraining from calling for assistance during an
assault; 5 6 or killing the abuser.157
The woman who suffers from BwS, according to Walker, has the
characteristics of "poor self-image and low self-esteem;" she "behaves in
stereotyped, traditional ways in order to please the batterer;" "she
suffers great guilt" and "continual stress ... psychosomatic ailments and
depression."158 Lavall6e was described by Dr. Fred Shane, the expert
called to give evidence on Bws, as a typical battered woman: "losing the
motivation to react [to beatings], becoming helpless and powerless ... has
a very disturbed or damaged self-esteem." 15 9 A battered woman who
kills is a special kind of battered woman (many battered women do not
resort to lethal force), said to have different perceptions of the violence
she endures. Browne found that the women in her study who killed their
abusers, perceived them as using greater violence, more frequently and
posing a greater threat to any children that existed. The batterers were
more likely to be dependent on alcohol, use weapons, make more death
threats, and to continue to abuse the woman even if she had taken up a
weapon herself.160
153 Walker recounts instances of women adducing evidence about Bws in cases involving each
of these defences: Terrfying Love, supra note 51 at 265-66.
154 Walker describes the acceptance of Bws as a sub-category of post-traumatic stress
disorder, ibid. at 48.
155 "She convinces herself ... that [the battering] will never happen again; her lover can
change, she tells herself." Ibid. at 45.
156 "Although the battered -woman sees it as unpredictable, she also feels that the acute
battering incident is somehow inevitable." Ibid. at 43.
157 "None of these women are ruthless killers. All are victims." Ibid. at 12.
158 Ibid. at 102-03.
159 Lavallk, sura note 124 at 884.
160 A. Browne, hen Bauerd Women i (New York. Free Press, 1987), especially c. 8.
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As a psychological notion, BWS proposes that battered women kill
because they are psychologically unable to terminate the relationship
through other means. Bws cannot explain why the violence occurred in
the first place, nor why some women do leave the relationship.161 As
shown above, while able to describe some surface differences between
the women who kill and those who do not, proponents of Bws cannot
explain why a woman ends up in one category rather than the other. As
such, the descriptions do nothing to challenge the notion that the women
who kill are acting abnormally while the women who leave, call the
police, divorce the man, etc., are acting within the confines of normal
and justifiable behaviour. The reasonableness of the woman deemed to
have killed in self-defence because of her suffering from Bws is merely
the reasonableness of the abnormal, of the individual who has a mental
disorder. Thus, although Lavall6e's action was held to be reasonable by
the Supreme Court, it is not the reasonableness of Cartesian rationality
(which accrues to men in self-defence cases, such as Beckford or
Gladstone Wdliams). 62
Without resorting to the conventional findings of insanity or
diminished capacity, the Court succeeded in finding that Lavalle was,
through Bws, mentally abnormal. It is my argument that this reveals how
women's experiences can only be translated into legal discourse through
the medium of repression. It occurs in rape trials through masculinist
notions of sexuality; it manifests itself in the recent introduction of
premenstrual syndrome (PMS) as evidence for the defence in some
criminal casesj 63 It has been present throughout the history of the legal
construction of marriage. 164 The acceptance of Bws evinced in Lavalle
exists in a frame that, although having feminist potential, produces
implications for the legal interpretation of Woman as a category which
are profoundly disturbing.
161 Comack, "Women Defendants", supra note 53.
162 Supra note 73.
163 The story of "Anna" was recently featured in S. Husband, "Murderers Talking" (1992)
Options 39. See also Dalton, "Menstruation and Crime", supra note 55; Dalton, The PremenstM=
Syn dme, supra note 55; and Allen, "At the Mercy of Her Hormones", supra note 55.
164 C. Smart, The Ties that Bind (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984); and K.
O'Donovan, SexualDivisions in Law (London: Weldenfeld and Nicolson, 1985).
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C. Psychiatric Victimization
While researchers such as Walker define themselves as feminist
and argue that there is a pragmatic necessity to their work as expert
witnesses,1 65 others feel uneasy about the effects of translating the
woman's experience into psychiatric knowledge. Schneider argues that
expert evidence about Bws allows the court to view the woman as
mentally ill, blaming her pathological reactions rather than any
underlying, causative social conditions. 166 Comack argues that "the
woman is reduced to a 'case' and her experiences are made compatible
with the behaviours of dogs in cages."167 Loseke and Cahill see Ews as
transforming the woman into a "true" victim, "more acted upon than
acting."168 Dobash and Dobash note that, despite describing the male
role in the cycle of violence in great detail, no effort is made to explain
it.169 For the woman's victimization to be complete, the cycle of violence
has to repeat itself continually. The stories cited by Walker and Browne,
among others, do not include any batterers who did seek help or who did
recognize that they had a problem (perhaps no such men exist; however,
this is surely an issue that should be addressed).
The battered woman is portrayed by exponents of the syndrome
as unique in her psychological experience (akin only to Seligman's dogs,
perhaps). The assertion of uniqueness is crucial to the idea of a
syndrome which is abnormal in its condition. Others, however, have
asserted that the battered woman may not be so "sick" as is claimed.
For example, Loseke and Cahill have analyzed the behaviours of couples
who are separating ("uncoupling"). They write:
The lengthy "leaving and returning" cycle said to be characteristic of battered women is a
typical feature of the uncoupling process. Further, the guilt, concern, regret, bitterness,
disappointment, depression and lowered perception of self attributed to battered women
are labels for emotions often reported by women and men in the process of
uncoupling. 70
165 Walker, Terrifying Love, supra note 51 at 10.
166 E.M. Schneider, "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering" (1986) 9 Women's Rts. L Rep. 195.
167 "Legal Recognition", supra note 1 at 23.
168 in Comack, ibid.
169 Women, /wlenee and Social Change, supra note 12 at 225.
170 Loseke & Cahill, quoted in Comack, supra note 1.
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It may be, then, that the similar emotional reactions of battered women
and separating couples reveal the significance-hardly acknowledged 171
-of the romantic relationship which is such a crucial component of
most marriages and cohabitations in contemporary society.
Just as it is possible to argue that the legal construction of
marriage permits a degree of violence to be perpetrated on the wife by
the husband,172 so it can be said that contemporary elaboration of the
nature of romantic love contains within it the potential for precisely the
kind of reactions that lead to the battered woman being categorized as
suffering from a psychiatric disorder. Estrich questions the necessity for
any woman-specific notion in determining whether or not a defence is
made out./73 At the surface level of legal rules and legal reasoning there
is no necessity. Need is apparent, however, in two very different
locations. First, the battered woman who kills may desperately need a
defence founded on Bws in order to avoid a life sentence. To advocate
the value of BWS here is to make a pragmatic and short-term argument.
The second source of need lies within legal discourse. To admit the
reasonableness of the battered woman's lethal act would challenge the
masculine order of rules embodied in the law of marriage and the laws
prohibiting violence. Representing the battered woman as suffering
from a psychiatric disorder contains any challenge within her act of
resistance to the violence that the law of marriage otherwise endorses.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REFORM OF ENGLISH LAW
The criticisms that I have made about the defences available in
English criminal law to the battered woman who kills can be summarized
in three main arguments. In each section I will set out the implications
of the Canadian legal interpretation of conjugal homicide by battered
women for the possible reform of English criminal law.
A. Self-Defence
Within the law relating to self-defence, there are patent
constraints in its interpretation which prevent the battered woman from
171 Comack is one of the few to acknowledge the importance of the aspect: "Legal
Recognition", supra note 1 at 24.
1 72 See Edwards, supra note 6; Dobash & Dobash, supra note 12; and Young, supra note 53.
1 73 S. Estrich, "Defending Women" (1990) 88 Mich. L Rev. 1430.
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successfully pleading its applicability. Other jurisdictions have
recognized the existence of such constraints and have, through judicial
reinterpretation, taken steps to remove them.174 Similar steps should be
taken here to open up a defence which is currently a narrow and
stereotyped understanding of the-battered woman's position. The recent
decision of Lavallde demonstrates how such an opening-up may be
initiated.
B. Provocation
The battered woman who pleads provocation can only succeed
when the relevant event fits into an extremely narrow frame structured
around typically masculine modes of reaction, emotion, and
understanding. To advocate the reform of the defence of provocation is
not to argue for one law for women and another for men, since it is more
the case that the current position is that of one law for men and none for
women.' 7 5 An examination of the case law reveals that women are
currently expected to conform to these masculine modes of provocation
and response. The effect is to exclude women such as Thornton from
the doctrinal elaboration of the defence. Their exclusion and the narrow
interpretation of provocation is the result of an inadequate
understanding of the position of battered women in terms of (1) their
reactions and responses to the fact of abuse and violence within an
intimate relationship; and (2) the legal construction of marriage.
As far as (1) is concerned, steps must be taken to ensure that the
judiciary gains a proper understanding of the battered woman's position.
This could be done by establishing a committee of inquiry into violence
in intimate relationships, perhaps along the lines of the many Canadian
initiatives in the 1980s. Any such inquiry should take account of the
considerable amount of research carried out by feminists in Britain as
well as other jurisdictions at least since the 1970s. Steps must also be
taken to ensure that the jury understand the position of the battered
174 See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d. 548 (Wash. 1977); Ke//y, supra note 54; Lavalle, supra note
124; and C. Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense and the Law (Columbus,
Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1989).
175 The few attempts to claim that women beat their male partners in the same way as men
batter women have been severely criticized: Jones, supra note 20 at 295-321; Pleck et aL, "The
Battered Data Syndrome: A Comment on Steinmetz' Article" (1977-78) 2 Victimology 680; 0.
Walker, Family Violence and the Women's Movement" The Conceptual Politics of Struggle (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990). S. Steinmetz was the major proponent of the "battered
husband" position with "The Battered Husband Syndrome" (1977-78) 2 Victimology 499.
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woman, a concern voiced in the strongest of terms by Madam Justice
Wilson in Lavallde. This should be done by admitting evidence about
violence in marriage, the lack of viable solutions for many battered
women, and the incidence of serious injury after leaving the abuser or
calling the police. The temptation to argue battered woman syndrome
as a convenient shorthand should, I would urge, be avoided, since it
replays many of the masculinist prejudices about Woman that already
abound within the legal system. Its acceptance might lead to acquittals
for some women; in the long term, it can only do further damage to the
continually derided notion of femininity that operates within legal
discourse.176
Instead, recourse should be made to the work of researchers
such as Schneider and Ewing on the "traumatic bonding" that can
develop between battered woman and abuser or between hostage and
kidnapper, or the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered
Women in the United States, which has investigated many lines of
defence other than the dubious BWS. If we return to Lavallde, the image
used by Madam Justice Wilson, that of the hostage, could provide a
positive starting-point for defence lawyers seeking an easily
understandable notion around which to structure a defence. The image
of the hostage avoids the inherent pathology within the idea of the
woman who suffers from BWS.
In terms of (2), the legal construction of marriage, there exists a
legal culture of violence in which conjugal violence takes place. The law
has allowed few remedies to be available to women who experience
assaults at the hands of their partners. The law displays an extreme
reluctance to intervene in any way that would provide useful options for
such women; or indeed, going further, in any way that would show that
violence by men against women is not a legitimated characteristic of
conjugal relations. When homicide is committed by a woman, she is
judged according to a simplistic dichotomy between true and false
victims; a dichotomy symptomatic of the underlying legal construction of
femininity. If she falls into the category of the false victim, she
experiences punishments of a terrifying severity: life imprisonment, the
death penalty.177 If she falls into the category of the true victim, she has
176 Note that many believe that the recent decision in the re-trial of Kiranjit Ahluwalia will
open the door to judicial acceptance of Ews-an eventuality which, despite its pragmatic attraction
for individual cases, can only worsen the general position of women in legal discourse.
177 One of the activist statements from Justice for Women, who are campaigning for the
release of Sara Thornton and for reform of the law of provocation, is "Sara Thornton escaped a life
in hell for a life in jail." See also E. Rapaport, "The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination"
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conformed to the narrow masculinist definition of legal doctrine;
although she may receive a lesser sentence or an acquittal as a result, the
effect is to perpetuate the legal repression of women in marital
relationships. This dichotomy is the logical symptomatology of a legal
culture of violence which sacrifices Woman to maintain an idealized
representation of union and community in marriage.
(1991) 25 L & S. Rev. 367 for gender discrimination which sentences more women than men to
death for conjugal homicide.
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